Malware Detection at the Microarchitecture Level using Machine Learning
  Techniques by Kwan, Abigail
Malware Detection at the Microarchitecture Level using Machine Learning
Techniques
A THESIS
Presented to the Department of Computer Engineering and Computer Science
California State University, Long Beach
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for
the University Honors Program Certificate
By Abigail Kwan
Spring 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
12
01
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 M
ay
 20
20
ABSTRACT
Malware Detection at the Microarchitecture Level using Machine Learning
Techniques
By
Abigail Kwan
Spring 2020
Detection of malware cyber-attacks at the processor microarchitecture level has re-
cently emerged as a promising solution to enhance the security of computer systems. Se-
curity mechanisms, such as hardware-based malware detection, use machine learning al-
gorithms to classify and detect malware with the aid of Hardware Performance Counters
(HPCs) information. The ML classifiers are fed microarchitectural data extracted from
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs), which contain behavioral data about a soft-
ware program. These HPCs are captured at run-time to model the program’s behavior.
Since the amount of HPCs are limited per processor, many techniques employ feature re-
duction to reduce the amount of HPCs down to the most essential attributes. Previous
studies have already used binary classification to implement their malware detection after
doing extensive feature reduction. This results in a simple identification of software be-
ing either malware or benign. This research comprehensively analyzes different hardware-
based malware detectors by comparing different machine learning algorithms’ accuracy
with binary and multi-class classification models. Our experimental results indicate that
when compared to complex machine learning models (e. g. Neural Network and Logistic),
light-weight J48 and JRip algorithms perform better in detecting the malicious patterns
even with the introduction of multiple types of malware. Although their detection accu-
racy slightly lowers, their robustness (Area Under the Curve) is still high enough that they
deliver a reasonable false positive rate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the world is increasingly connected through the internet, many devices are prone
to security threats and malware attacks. Malware is a piece of code designed to perform
various malicious activities, such as destroying the data, stealing information, running de-
structive or intrusive programs on devices to perform Denial-of- Service (DoS) attacks,
and gaining root access without the consent of user. These programs are used to compro-
mise user data and cripple networks [2, 3]. The recent proliferation of computing devices
in mobile and Internet-of-Things (IoTs) domains further exacerbates the malware attacks
and calls for eective malware detection techniques [1, 4]. A recent survey showed that the
number of security incidents in 2014 rose to 42.8 million incidents [5]. Despite the number
of antivirus software out on the market, malware still persist due to the broad number of
virus variations that could exist.
Conventional signature-based and semantic-based malware detection methods mostly
impose significant computational overhead to the system. Furthermore, they are unable to
detect unknown threats making them unsuitable for devices with limited available comput-
ing and memory resources [6]. The emergence of new malware threats requires patching
or updating the software-based malware detection solutions (such as off-the-shelf anti-
virus) that need a vast amount of memory and hardware resources, which is not feasible
for emerging computing systems specially in embedded mobile and IoT devices [3]. A typ-
ical antivirus software uses static characteristics of malware to detect if it is a threat [7].
This is extremely exploitable as it requires an up-to-date database in which a new malware
won’t be detected [8]. Since software antivirus programs can be bypassed, researchers have
begun studying hardware-based malware detection in order to increase security for com-
puters and networks.
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Recent works have demonstrated that malware can be differentiated from normal ap-
plications by classifying anomalies using Machine Learning (ML) techniques in low-level
microarchitectural feature spaces captured by Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs)
[1, 6, 7]. The HPCs are a set of special purpose registers built into modern microproces-
sors to capture the trace of hardware-related events for a running program [9]. ML-based
malware detectors can be implemented in microprocessor hardware with significantly low
overhead as compared to software-based methods, as detection inside the hardware is very
fast within few clock cycles [1, 5].
1.1 Related Work
In this section, we discuss recent related work for hardware-based malware detection.
The work in [10] had a similar approach when it came to data collection and classifica-
tion. They also implemented the machine learning algorithms into software and hardware.
They found that the software implementation had a large overhead, which caused the algo-
rithm to lag behind due to latency. The hardware implementation was done using Vivado
High-Level-Synthesis, which allowed them to collect data on power estimation, data, and
latency. Their results found that more simple classifiers such as OneR were more efficient
when implemented on hardware. Even though it was not as accurate, it was faster, took
less power, and the least amount of area.
Besides regular machine learning methods, some other studies have examined hardware-
based detection using ensemble learning. Researchers in [1] used ensemble learning in their
hardware implementation in order to find out how it could improve malware detection.
The two techniques they used were boosting and bagging. Boosting is a technique that
weighs each training dataset and adjusts the weights based on the overall accuracy of the
model. Bagging, on the other hand, is another ensemble learning technique that takes a
statistical value from multiple random samples and uses it to train the ML models. They
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compared the robustness and the accuracy of regular classifiers with boosted classifiers.
They found that boosting techniques improved the classification by as much as 17% with a
much lower amount of HPCs.
In addition, a recent work in [6] proposed a two-stage machine learning-based ap-
proach for run-time malware detection in which the first level classifies applications us-
ing a multiclass classification technique into either benign or one of the malware classes
(Virus, Rootkit, Backdoor, and Trojan). In the second level, to have a high detection per-
formance, the authors deploy an ML model that works best for each class of malware and
further apply effective ensemble learning to enhance the performance of hardware-based
malware detection. The work in [3] also proposed an effective machine learning-based
hardware-assisted malware detection framework for embedded devices which only utilizes a
limited number (only 4) of low-level features in a microprocessor i.e., HPC events to facili-
tate the run-time malware detection.
Machine learning and ensemble learning are not the only methods to implement hardware-
based malware detection. The researchers at [11] used Akoman, a malware detection tech-
nique that builds behavioral signatures for malware detection. The technique collects sig-
natures and creates an aggregation matrix. After that, it applies fast and exact signatures
to compare the program to likely malware families in order to determine whether or not it
is actually benign. They tested Akoman using 36 benign Linux programs and 13 families
of Linux malware programs. They found that Akoman can achieve an acceptable perfor-
mance based on its metrics for average precision, recall, and F-measure.
Recent research have also dealt with the theoretical side of hardware-based malware
detection. The study in [12] analyzed the security guarantees of hardware-based malware
detection using 4 HPCs. They calculated the probability of malware being detected when
HPCs are monitored at a certain sampling interval. They used control-flow graphs to out-
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line programs. Their research found that it is difficult for malware to match all possible
HPCs, with the probability of matching four HPC parameters is exp−40. This means that
HPCs are highly secure compared to normal antivirus software since malware would have
a difficult time guessing the right HPCs to pass undetected.
1.2 Motivation for Research
Hardware-based malware detection has become an increasingly important topic in the
field of cybersecurity. Implementation at a hardware level reduces the chances of malware
subverting protection mechanisms[1, 7].Previous research has already determined classifi-
cation of several malware types using memory access operations[13]. The researchers were
able to classify various malware types based on the number of memory accesses. There
also exists research that deal with binary classification of malware using hardware per-
formance counters (HPC) [1, 10]. According to their findings, simple decision tree algo-
rithms such as OneR were more effective in hardware implementation compared to higher
accuracy algorithms such as logistics and MultiLayerPerceptron. Simple classifiers were
found to be more cost-effective when it came to execution time, accuracy per logic area,
and number of HPC used. This thesis will expand on these findings to determine if certain
machine learning methods are more efficient with differentiating between multiple types of
malware. Instead of only binary classification, this thesis will explore how certain machine
learning methods perform in detecting five different types of malware: backdoor, rootkit,
trojans, viruses, and worms.
The thesis is organized as follows. Background information concerning malware, HPCs,
and machine learning algorithms are detailed in chapter 2. The experimental setup about
the dataset and approach used is described in chapter 3. In chapter 4, we discuss the re-
sults collected and provide an analysis of the differences between binary and multiclass
classification amongst the various ML classifiers. Finally, in chapter 5, the conclusion and
4
future work is presented for this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Types of Malware
Malware can have multiple infection vectors. One way is through exploiting vulner-
able services over a network[14]. Large scale installations of systems with the same vul-
nerability can allow malicious software to infect automatically. Another way malware can
infect systems is through drive-by downloads[14]. The malware downloads automatically
by exploiting a web browser vulnerability. Because of the variety in infection vectors and
methods, malware can be categorized based on the purposes and ways they are able to
reach vulnerable systems[15]. For the purposes of this thesis, this section gives an overview
of the five different malware types that we are testing.
• Backdoor Backdoors are methods used to bypass regular authentication or encryp-
tion in a system. Backdoors are used alongside Trojans so attackers can have access
to a remote computer or network.
• Rootkit Rootkits are designed to be stealthy software that hide certain processes
from a computer system. [14, 15].
• Trojans: Trojans are software programs that perform malicious attacks under the
guise of being a regular program. [15]
• Viruses: Viruses are dependent malware that can attach to other system programs.
When it is executed, the affected area gets infected.[ye] It spreads because it can in-
fect not only local files, but also files on shared servers, thereby affecting other com-
puters as well [14].
• Worms: Worms are programs that are able to run independently. They propagate
by copying itself from an infected host into another machine, usually through the
6
operating system. [15]
Because of the numerous types of malware, a diversified dataset is needed in order to
design an efficient malware detection system. Features must be collected from hardware
performance counters (HPCs) using data mining.
2.2 Hardware Performance Counters
Hardware performance counters are registers built into a microprocessor in order to
store data about hardware events [1, 9, 10]. These registers give information about the
run-time behavior of software programs. The advantage of using HPCs is increased secu-
rity. Unlike antivirus software which characterize malware based on static characteristics,
HPCs characterize based on a program’s actual behavior[16]. HPCs are also not accessi-
ble to malware. The number of HPCs that are available on a processor vary depending on
the model[9]. For example, an Intel Atom processor only has 4 HPCs to monitor micro-
architectural behavior at run-time [10]. Because of this limitation, it’s important to nar-
row down the number of features so that the machine learning model can be implemented
on hardware more efficiently to detect the malware.
2.3 Machine Learning Methods
In a supervised learning process, a training set is used to create a classification model
[17]. The learning algorithm is given a set of N samples with A attributes such that when
given new data, it accurately predicts the class[18]. The training examples are tuples (x,
y), where x refers to the sample and y refers to the class[18]. In this thesis, the data will
be put through five machine learning algorithms: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), OneR,
Logistic, JRip, and J48.
Multilayer Perceptron : The Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) (Figure 1) algorithm is a neu-
ral network that makes predictions based on mapping. It contains multiple layers
with one or more hidden layers [19]. MLP is a type of logistic regression where the
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FIGURE 1. The Multilayer Perceptron neural network has hidden layers that
are not directly exposed to the input. This particular figure is a feed-forward
network. Its purpose is to approximate some function f(x).
input is transformed based on weighting values. The weights on each node can be
changed after data is processed and the error is calculated. After the weights are
calculated, the weights are plugged into an activation function to approximate the
output. The MLP function is defined as[20]:
fMLP : Rn0 −→ R, x = (x1, x2, ...xn0) −→ y (2.1)
Where x refers to the number of inputs while R refers to the activation function.
The standard activation function used in most MLPs is σ(t) = 1/(1 + e−t) [20]. The
activation function is used after the hidden layers have been calculated.
OneR : The OneR is a simple decision tree based algorithm. It builds one rule for each
attribute in the training set, then selects the rule with the smallest error[21]. The
rule is built by finding out the most frequent class, which is simply the class that
appears the most for that value. The algorithm is as follows[22]:
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1 For each attribute x, form a rule:
2 For each value y from the domain of x,
3 Select the set of instances where y has value x,
4 Let c be the most frequent class in that set.
5 Add the following clause to the rule for x:
6 if x has value y then the class is c
7 Calculate the classification accuracy of this rule
8 Use the rule with the highest classification accuracy.
Logistic Regression : Logistic Regression is a linear classifier that uses assumes the out-
come is a linear function of independent variables. The probability of the linear com-
bination in logistic regression can be represented with the following formula:[23]
pi(x) = Pr(y = 1|x) (2.2)
This formula can be further expanded by defining it as:
pi(x) = Pr(y = 1|x; β) = 1/(1 + exp(−β0 − βTx) (2.3)
β0 is a constant that refers to the bias in the equation. β
Tx refers to unknown values
in the model. Therefore, logistic regression models the probability of a variable y
taking on the value y = 1 depending on a number of independent variables x.
JRip : JRip is a rule-based classifier which creates propositional rules that can be used
to classify elements[24]. It takes the instances in the dataset and evaluates them in
increasing order [25]. JRip then generates a set of rules and attributes for that par-
ticular class before moving on to the next class.
9
J48 : J48 is a lightweight classifier that creates a decision tree using the C4.5 algorithm.
The C4.5 algorithm is a decision tree algorithm that uses gain ratio to select the best
”splitting” feature when making a decision tree[26]. Gain Ratio is defined as
GainRatio(A) =
Gain(A)
SplitInfo(A)
, (2.4)
where Gain(A) represents Information Gain for feature A and SplitInfo(A) represents
the potential information generated by splitting the set D over n outcomes according
to feature A. SplitInfo can be further defined as
SplitInfoA(D) = −
k∑
j=1
|Dj|
|D| × log2
( |Dj|
|D|
)
. (2.5)
2.4 Binary vs. Multiclass Classification
Binary classification is the simplest type of machine problem that takes an element
and classifies it into one of two groups. It determines the grouping of an element by look-
ing at its attributes. In the context of malware detection, binary classification determines
whether a program is malware or benign. What makes multiclass classification different
from binary classification is the number of classes that must be taken into account. The
set of target classes can grow dynamically and is not fixed, which can make it increasingly
complex [27]. For malware detection, it means that the machine learning algorithm must
identify if a software is a specific type of malware.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.1 Dataset
For training and testing the machine learning models we used a per-class dataset of
microarchitectural features in [6]. The applications were executed on an Intel Xeon X5550
machine running Ubuntu 14.04 with Linux 4.4 Kernel. The dataset contains complete
samples collected from HPCs for both benign and malware. The malware data can be fur-
ther divided into five categories. There are 16 features collected for this dataset. Some of
the features included are bus cycles, cache misses, branch instructions, etc. The dataset
was collected using Perf, which is a tool available on the Linux operating system. Perf can
measure multiple events simultaneously [6]. Perf collects the data based on the execution
of both benign and malware applications. The programs are run in isolated environments
called Linux Containers which provide access to actual performance instead of emulated
HPCs[6]. A total of about 12000 samples were taken from the dataset and combined in
Excel to achieve a 70% - 30% data split. For binary classification, the data was combined
to ensure about 70% malware - 70% benign for the training set and 30% malware - 30%
benign for the test set. For multiclass classification, the same number of samples was used
except the malware data was replaced with more specific classifiers. Instead of just mal-
ware, it would be labeled trojan, rootkit, etc.
3.2 WEKA
For this thesis, we are using WEKA to process the dataset and obtain the results for
classification accuracy. WEKA is a software tool developed by researchers at the Univer-
sity of Waikato that contains a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining.
For this experiment, we are using the Explorer application of WEKA for both feature se-
lection and classification. The Explorer application has several tabs that aid in process-
11
FIGURE 2. WEKA’s Explorer application contains several tools that can be
used for applying machine learning. The Classify tab is where the algorithms
are applied to create a model that can be used for test sets.
ing the dataset. For feature selection, the Select Attributes tab is used. This tab contains
the Attribute Evaluator which can be set by the user to select different types of attribute
evaluation methods. It also has a section where the search method can be selected. For
classification, the machine learning algorithms are selected under the Classify tab. In this
tab, the algorithm can be selected under the Classifier section. This tab also allows for
customization for testing under the test options section. The results of the test set can be
seen in the Classifier output window. An example of how the Classify tab looks can be
seen in Figure 2.
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3.3 Feature Selection
Feature selection must be used on the data in order to find the best possible classifiers
to use with the limited amount of HPCs [1, 6] (Figure 3). Previous studies have indicated
that many algorithms do poorly with large numbers of irrelevant features[18]. Performing
feature selection on the data can also increase the accuracy of the learning algorithm.
For the purposes of this thesis, the feature selection algorithm that will be used is In-
formation Gain. Information Gain makes use of entropy, which is a common quantity in
information theory associated with any random variable. Since entropy measures impuri-
ties in the training set, we can define Information Gain as the entropy of the training set
minus the average entropy of the child nodes. Information Gain is represented using the
formula[28]:
IG(X, y) = H(X)−H(X|y) (3.1)
IG(X, y) refers to the information in the dataset for a specific random variable y. H(X)
refers to the entropy for the training set, while H(X—y) refers to the conditional entropy
based on the random variable y. After the data is collected, the extracted data must go
through pre-processing. The data is subdivided into 70% - 30% split with 70% for the
training set and 30% for the test set. Since HPCs only have a limited amount of registers,
the number of attributes per data must be reduced. Using WEKA’s Attribute Evaluator,
features are reduced using Information Gain Attribute Evaluation. The search method
used is Ranker. Features are then reduced by taking the top 8 features from the results of
the training set, then further reduced down up until it reaches 2 features.
For the purpose of this thesis, we used feature selection for both binary and multi-
classification. As seen in Table 1 and Table 2, the top 8 features for both types of classifi-
cation is very similar. The order only differs slightly, which tells us that these top features
are the ones that matter most for malware detection for this specific dataset. L1-dcache-
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FIGURE 3. The feature selection process selects relevant predictors from a
training set in order to increase the accuracy of the prediction variable. In this
model, orange represents redundant or impure classifiers while green
represents the desired classifier.
TABLE 1. Binary Classification Order of Attributes
loads and L1-dcache-stores are the top 2 HPCs after extensive feature selection, which
means that these two HPCs are really important to use when implementing the actual ma-
chine learning onto hardware.
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TABLE 2. Multiclass Classification Order of Attributes
FIGURE 4. Overview of run-time hardware-based malware detection approach
[1]
3.4 Classification
Once the desired features have been determined, the training set must go through
WEKA’s Classifier. For each classifier, we supply the test set. WEKA then details the
accuracy of each classifier in the output section. It also provides a confusion matrix that
details how many were classified correctly for each attribute. The results also detail impor-
tant information such as ROC Area and false positive rate. After obtaining the results, we
graph the ROC Area by visualizing the threshold curve and extracting the true positive
and false positive rates. The general approach for the classification was based on a previ-
ous study[1]. An overview can be seen in the Figure 4.
15
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Accuracy of Classification
To evaluate the efficiency of the number of HPCs used, the percentage accuracy of
each classification was calculated. The accuracy was calculated for different numbers of
HPCs (16, 8, 4, and 2). As seen in Figure 5, the accuracy of the classifiers tend to go down
as the number of HPCs decreased. More complex algorithms such as Logistic and MLP
had the lowest percentage accuracy. OneR had no discernible decrease because the al-
gorithm only relies on one HPC to predict the behavior. For the multiclass classification
model, the accuracy took a hit for all five classifiers. Since the same amount of malware
samples were used for both binary and multiclass classification, having more specific classes
reduced the accuracy of malware identification. Figure 5 shows how the accuracy is much
lower for all classifiers. Noticeably, the more complex logistic and MLP did better than the
OneR when it came to classifying different types of malware.
4.2 Comparison of Receiver Operating Characteristics
Another metric to observe is the Receiving Operating Characteristics (ROC) result.
ROC measures the Area Under the Curve (AUC) for evaluating the robustness of each
ML classifier[1, 4]. The ROC corresponds to the probability that the classifier correctly
identified which application is malware and which is benign. Using this data, it is possible
to find the threshold where the classifier achieves 100% accurate positive identification. As
TABLE 3. Binary Classification ROC Area for Different Number of HPCs
16
(a) Binary Classification
(b) Multiclass Classification
FIGURE 5. Accuracy of Classification Models per Number of HPCs
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TABLE 4. J48 and Logistic Multiclass Classification Models’ ROC Area for
Varying Numbers of HPCs
seen in Table 3, the ROC Area results correspond to the accuracy of the ML classifiers. A
notable result is the sharp drop for the MLP classifier when it goes from 4 HPC down to
2HPC. J48 also dropped but didn’t lose as much ROC compared to the other classifiers.
This result tells us that having 4 HPCs is an ideal amount of HPCs without losing too
much accuracy for binary classification. The visualization of the ROC area can be seen in
Figure 6 for 8HPCs and 4HPCs. From these graphs, we can see that the reduction from 8
HPCs down to 4 HPCs reduces the true positive rate of most ML classifiers. It also shows,
however, that some classifiers do well better than others even with feature reduction. For
example, JRip and J48 still did better than the other classifiers, with J48 maintaining an
ROC Area over 0.9 for all different number of HPCs. This gives valuable insight on which
ML Classifier is best depending on the number of HPCs available.
Unlike binary classification, the ROC area in multiclass classification models vary de-
pending on the type of malware class. For this thesis, we show the multiclass classification
results for two machine learning algorithms: J48 and Logistic (Table 4). J48 outperformed
18
(a) 8 HPCs
(b) 4 HPCs
FIGURE 6. Binary Classification ROC Graphs with Varying Number of HPCs
19
the rest of the classifiers, on average. It did worse than logistic at identifying certain mal-
ware when the number of HPCs were high, but it did better when the number of HPCs
were low. The ROC Area for 4HPCS of both J48 and logistic are represented as AUC
graphs in Figure 7. As observed, the logistic multiclass classification model really suffers
in performance when there are a low amount of HPCS. The J48 model, on the other hand,
seems to have consistent performance for all types of malware.
From this we can conclude that the complexity of an algorithm has no advantage
on accurately detecting multiple classes of malware. Even though logistic was more ac-
curate at 8-16 HPCs, that scenario is usually unlikely to be implemented at a hardware
level due to the limitations in the number of HPCs per processor. Therefore, implement-
ing lightweight algorithms such as J48 may be more efficient when implementing multi-
classification in the hardware level.
20
(a) Logistic
(b) J48
FIGURE 7. Multiclass Classification 4HPCs ROC Graphs
21
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Hardware-based malware detection is an emerging field in cybersecurity that imple-
ments machine learning-based malware detectors onto microprocessors. Hardware-based
detectors rely on machine learning classiers and use microarchitectural events captured by
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) at run-time to identify the malicious patterns.
Recent studies have shown that hardware performance and detection accuracy highly de-
pendon the type of machine learning used, as well as the type of HPCs used. Previous
works have used binary classification to test the implementation of hardware-based mal-
ware detection. In this thesis, we compared and contrasted the results of binary and mul-
ticlass classification models to find out the differences when it comes to accuracy and de-
tection performance. In our results, we found that the multiclass classification models de-
pended on similar features as the binary classification models. We also found that out of
the five machine learning algorithms used, the most efficient methods were J48 and JRip,
which both performed well even with the introduction of multiple types of malware. The
robustness of the J48 algorithm was also proven further with the ROC graphs for both bi-
nary and multiclass classification. Given the variety of current malware, it is more efficient
to implement this type of algorithm for hardware-based detection in order to better detect
different malware.
5.1 Future Work
Currently, we are working on an ongoing research to implement multiclass classifi-
cation machine learning detectors in MATLAB for hardware-based malware detection.
MATLAB has a toolbox called HDL Coder that allows for the synthesis of MATLAB code
into VHDL. Using HDL Coder as a tool for hardware-based malware detection is a new di-
rection in this research as previous works have used Vivado High-Level Synthesis instead.
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Currently, I am working with the OneR algorithm as a case study for testing the con-
version process of HDL Coder. I implemented the OneR algorithm in MATLAB by fol-
lowing Holte’s 1R Classifier [22]. The current MATLAB code takes in a set of vectors as
a training set and outputs the top feature after calculating the accuracy of each feature.
Data is first sorted into temporary vectors based on their class (malware or benign). The
values in these vectors are then quantisized to find the right rules for each feature. After
that, the values are tested for each feature using the rules that were created from quan-
tisization. To calculate the accuracy, it first counts how many values were predicted cor-
rectly compared to their original class in the training set. The code then takes that total
and divides it by the original number of data in the training set. The resulting percentage
is the accuracy of that feature. We are working towards proposing the hardware imple-
mentations of binary and multiclass classification models used for hardware-based malware
detection and extracting the hardware overhead and resource utilization characteristics of
the detectors such area, latency, and power consumption.
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